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Choosing the option with the highest expected value (EV; reward probability× rewardmag-
nitude) maximizes the intake of reward under conditions of uncertainty. However, human
economic choices indicate that our value calculation has a subjective component whereby
probability and reward magnitude are not linearly weighted. Using a similar economic
framework, our goal was to characterize how subjective value inﬂuences the generation of
simple motor actions. Speciﬁcally, we hypothesized that attributes of saccadic eye move-
ments could provide insight into how rhesus monkeys, a well-studied animal model in
cognitive neuroscience, subjectively value potential visual targets. In the ﬁrst experiment,
monkeys were free to choose by directing a saccade toward one of two simultaneously
displayed targets, each of which had an uncertain outcome. In this task, choices were
more likely to be allocated toward the higher valued target. In the second experiment,
only one of the two possible targets appeared on each trial. In this task, saccadic reaction
times (SRTs) decreased toward the higher valued target. Reward magnitude had a much
stronger inﬂuence on both choices and SRTs than probability, whose effect was observed
only when reward magnitude was similar for both targets. Across EV blocks, a strong rela-
tionship was observed between choice preferences and SRTs. However, choices tended
to maximize at skewed values whereas SRTs varied more continuously. Lastly, SRTs were
unchanged when all reward magnitudes were 1×, 1.5×, and 2× their normal amount,
indicating that saccade preparation was inﬂuenced by the relative value of the targets
rather than the absolute value of any single-target. We conclude that value is not only an
important factor for deliberative decision making in primates, but also for the selection and
preparation of simple motor actions, such as saccadic eye movements. More precisely, our
results indicate that, under conditions of uncertainty, saccade choices and reaction times
are inﬂuenced by the relative expected subjective value of potential movements.
Keywords: oculomotor-capture,motor preparation, utility, prospect theory, neuroeconomics, reaction time, reward,
probability
INTRODUCTION
Choosing under conditions of uncertainty requires estimating the
value of each alternative and then selecting the option whose value
is highest. Choosing based on expected value (EV), the product of
rewardmagnitude and probability,maximizes the intake of reward
over time. However, subjectivity in the valuation process results in
choices that deviate from the EV prediction (Dayan and Abbott,
2001;Glimcher, 2003, 2011; Rolls, 2005;Milstein andDorris, 2007;
Rolls et al., 2008). For example, behavioral economic studies in
humans have shown that both reward magnitude and probability
are non-linearly weighted before being combined (Gonzalez and
Wu, 1999; Trepel et al., 2005; Paulus and Frank, 2006; Hsu et al.,
2009).
Recently, value has also been shown to inﬂuence choice behav-
ior and underlying neural processes in the well-studied rhesus
monkey model (McCoy and Platt, 2005; Padoa-Schioppa and
Assad, 2006; So and Stuphorn, 2010). The inﬂuence of value on
reaction time,however,has not been fully characterized. Therefore,
our goal was to examine the relationship between choice and sac-
cadic reaction times (SRTs), another common behavioral measure
of a wide variety of decision factors, under conditions of chang-
ing value. If such a relationship exists, then SRT can be used to
study the moment-to-moment neural activations underlying the
valuation process with invasive electrophysiological techniques
particularly under conditions in which speeded responses are
favored.
The behavioral economic studies that measure subjective value
rely mainly on methodologies that are largely incompatible with
the non-human primate model such as verbal or written com-
munication. For example, experimenters typically present human
subjects with the choice between a risky, high-reward gamble (the
prospect), and a lower, but guaranteed, reward (the certain out-
come).Varying the rewardmagnitude of the certain outcome until
the subject is indifferent to the prospect and the certain outcome
provides the researchers with a certainty equivalent (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992). This certainty equivalent provides an estimate
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of how the reward magnitude is subjectively valued under risk.
Recently these techniques have been modiﬁed in monkey subjects
to examine the valuation process on choice using abstract symbols
to indicate reward magnitude or probability (Yang and Shadlen,
2007; Rorie et al., 2010; So and Stuphorn, 2010; Cai et al., 2011).
In an effort to yield speeded responses, we did not present
value cues that had to be assessed on each trial, but allowed ani-
mals to estimate the value of targets through experience across
blocks of ﬁxed value (e.g., Dorris and Munoz, 1998; Lauwereyns
et al., 2002; Takikawa et al., 2002; Ikeda and Hikosaka, 2003; Ding
and Hikosaka, 2007). Speciﬁcally, monkeys made simple saccadic
eye movements to visual targets whose values were manipulated
through changing the probability and reward magnitude they
yielded. Two behavioral measures assessed subjective value across
these prospects – the proportion of choices and SRT. Allocation of
choices provides us with an established measure of the monkeys’
preferences (Samuelson, 1938) and this was compared with the
latencywithwhichmonkeys respondedduring the sameprospects.
Our ﬁndings suggest that, when faced with uncertainty, monkeys
estimate the relative expected subjective value (RESV) of potential
actions similarly when both choosing and preparing simple motor
actions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
GENERAL METHODOLOGY
Twomale rhesusmonkeys (Macacamulatta) thatweighedbetween
9 and 13.5 kg each performed saccadic eye movement tasks for
liquid reward. All procedures were approved by the Queen’s Uni-
versity Animal Care Committee and complied with the guide-
lines of the Canadian Council on Animal Care. Animals were
under the close supervision of the university veterinarian. Surgi-
cal procedures have been described previously (Munoz and Istvan,
1998).
Behavioral paradigms, visual displays, delivery of liquid reward,
and storage of eye movement data were under the control of a PC
running a real-time data acquisition system (Gramalkn – Ryklin
Software). Red and green visual stimuli (11 cd/m2) were pro-
duced by a digital projector (Duocom InFocus SP4805, refresh rate
100Hz) andback-projectedonto a translucent screen that spanned
50˚ horizontal and 40˚ vertical of visual space. Left eye positionwas
recorded at 500Hz with a resolution of 0.1˚ using an infra-red eye
tracking system (Eyelink II, SR Research). Data analysis was per-
formed ofﬂine using MATLAB version 2007a (MathWorks Inc.,)
on a Pentium 4 personal computer.
BEHAVIORAL PARADIGMS
Subjects received liquid reward for successfully completing one
of three simple oculomotor tasks sharing the same root structure
(Figure 1). In each trial type, subjects were required to acquire,
then hold their gaze on, a centrally placed ﬁxation point for
800ms. After this epoch, the ﬁxation point was removed and
subjects were required to maintain central ﬁxation for an addi-
tional 400ms before targets were presented 10˚ to the left and/or
10˚ to the right. We referred to this 400ms epoch as the “uncer-
tainty period” because at this point in time subjects did not know
which speciﬁc trial type they were engaged in. The ﬁxed duration
of this period provided timing information which promoted the
FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigms. Each window represents what the
monkey sees chronologically ordered from top to bottom. Red ﬁlled circles
represent targets, green ﬁlled circles represent distractors, and unﬁlled
green circles represent potential distractor locations. (A)Two-target trials.
Both targets are displayed but the reward outcome for choosing a target is
probabilistic (%). (B) Single-target trials. Only one of the two potential
targets appears, but reward is certain. Note that during a particular prospect
block, the probability of target presentation at a particular location in
single-target trials equals the probability of receiving a reward for choosing
that target during two-target trials. (C) Distractor trials. These trials follow
the same pattern as single-target trials, with the addition of an irrelevant
green distractor being displayed prior to target appearance. Directing a
saccade toward a distractor aborts the trial and reward is withheld.
advanced preparation of upcoming saccades (Saslow, 1967; Dorris
et al., 1997). Subjects had to direct a saccade toward a target and
maintain ﬁxation on it for 300ms for the possibility of receiving a
liquid reward. The inter-trial interval was ﬁxed at 1000ms.
To receive a liquid reward, subjects were required to initiate a
saccade toward a displayed target within 70–1000ms of its presen-
tation. The value of the two possible target locations was varied
across 49 blocks of trials which we will refer to as prospects. The
details of how these prospects were structured are provided for
single-, two-target, and oculomotor-capture trials below and in
Table 1. Each prospect block consisted of 100± 15 trials and block
transitions were not signaled.
Two-target trials
The purpose of the two-target trials (Figure 1A) was to assess
which of the two valued targets the subject preferred. These tri-
als followed the aforementioned task structure with the following
exceptions. At the end of the uncertainty period, both left and
right targets were displayed simultaneously and subjects were free
to saccade toward either. Receipt of reward was probabilistic. We
refer to this measure of probability as reward probability. Reward
probability and their associated magnitudes were ﬁxed for each
target for a block of trials. The prospect for the next block was
randomly selected without replacement from Table 1.
Single-target trials
Single-target trials (Figure 1B) were used to assess how saccade
preparation was allocated across prospects. Compared to discrete
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Table 1 | Relative expected value of left target across 49 prospect blocks*.
Magnitude of reward
for the left target (mL)
Probability (%)** Magnitude of reward
for the right target (mL)
10 25 40 50 60 75 90
0.050 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.33 0.60 0.300
0.050 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.25 0.33 0.50 0.75 0.150
0.075 0.06 0.17 0.29 0.38 0.47 0.64 0.84 0.125
0.100 0.10 0.25 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.75 0.90 0.100
0.125 0.16 0.36 0.53 0.63 0.71 0.83 0.94 0.075
0.150 0.25 0.50 0.67 0.75 0.82 0.90 0.96 0.050
0.300 0.40 0.67 0.80 0.86 0.90 0.95 0.98 0.050
For the oculomotor-capture task, only the shaded blocks were used. For the relative versus absolute value task, only the bold cells were used.
*The relative expected value of the right target is 1− relative expected value of left target.
**For single-target trials, probability indicates the probability of the left target appearing. For two-target trials, probability indicates the probability of a reward being
delivered when the left target is selected. For both trials, the right target probability is 1−probability of left target.
choices during two-target trials, SRTs were a more continuous
measure. These trials followed the general framework of the two-
target trials, except that only one target was presented on each
trial. Unlike two-target trials, reward was guaranteed if the mon-
key made a correct saccade to the target, but the probability of the
target appearing in one of two locations varied between blocks.
We refer to this measure of probability as target probability. Target
probability and reward magnitude for each target were ﬁxed for
a block of trials and were randomly selected without replacement
from Table 1.
Oculomotor-capture trials
Oculomotor-capture trials (Figure 1C) probed the level of sac-
cade preparation at speciﬁc locations in the visual ﬁeld. These
trials were identical to single-target trials, except that an irrele-
vant circular green distractor, equiluminant to the red stimuli,
ﬂashed for 70ms halfway through the uncertainty period. If sub-
jects looked to the distractor (i.e., oculomotor-capture), the trial
was immediately aborted and reward was withheld, followed by
the inter-trial interval. Saccade preparation was indexed by the
proportion of oculomotor captures triggered by the presentation
of abrupt-onset visual distractors at particular locations.
Experiment 1: Prospect Task
This experiment combined two-target (25% of trials) and single-
target (75%of trials) trials together, to compare choice preferences
during two-target trialswith the SRTsduring single-target trials for
each prospect. Monkeys performed 49 different prospects, using
seven different reward magnitude and seven different probability
levels (Table 1). The same prospect was used for both single-target
and two-target trials during a given block. Monkeys completed,
on average, 12 blocks per day until satiated, and data from mul-
tiple experimental days were combined together for subsequent
analysis.
Experiment 2: Oculomotor-capture task
We interleaved single-target and oculomotor-capture trials
together (50% of each) to determine how monkeys allocated sac-
cade preparation to speciﬁc locations across the visual ﬁeld. A
subset of 11 prospects that spanned the range of values were used
in this experiment (Table 1, shaded cells). Distractors were equally
likely to be presented at the location of one of the two possible tar-
gets or orthogonal to the target (10˚ upward). This latter distractor
allowed us to assess levels of saccade preparation in non-valued
areas of the visual ﬁeld.
Experiment 3: Relative versus Absolute Value task
To examine the contribution of relative value versus absolute value
to saccade preparation, monkeys performed blocks of trials with
target rewardmagnitudes set at 1.0×, 1.5×, and 2.0× their normal
magnitudes. Only three blocks of trials that spanned the range of
prospects were tested (Table 1, bold cells). Our goal was to deter-
mine whether changes in absolute value contributed to SRT effects
beyond those observed for relative value.
DATA ANALYSIS
Trials were aborted online if eye position was not maintained
within a 3˚ diameter circle centered on the appropriate spatial
location or if saccades were initiated outside a 70- to 1000-ms tem-
poral window following target presentation. Oculomotor captures
were deﬁned as saccades initiated toward a 6˚ diameter spatial win-
dow centered on the distractor within a 70- to 200-ms temporal
window following distractor appearance. The spatial window was
relaxed due to the tendency of oculomotor-capture saccades to be
hypometric (Theeuwes et al., 1998;Milstein andDorris, 2007). The
ﬁrst 20 trials from all blocks were discarded fromofﬂine analysis to
allow subjects time to adjust to the new EV condition. Computer
software determined the beginning and end of each saccade using
velocity and acceleration criteria and accuracy was veriﬁed by the
experimenter. SRT was deﬁned as the time when eye velocity ﬁrst
surpassed 20˚/s following target presentation.
We deﬁned relative EV as:
[
p (T1) × r (T1)
]
[
p (T1) × r (T1)
] + [p (T2) × r (T2)
] (1)
Where p(T 1) and p(T 2) denote the proportion with which target
1 and target 2 appeared (single-target trials) or yielded a reward
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(two-target trials), respectively, during a block of trials. r(T 1) and
r(T 2) denote the rewardmagnitude in milliliter of water allocated
to each of the two targets, respectively.
We determined whether linear or logistic functions provided
superior ﬁts to our data using themodel selection criterion derived
from Akaike’s Information Criterion (Akaike, 1973; Sakamoto
et al., 1986). In general, logistic ﬁts provided superior ﬁts for choice
data and linear ﬁts were superior for SRT data. The one-parameter
logistic function we used was:
f (x) = e
βx
1 + eβx (2)
Where β> 0 is the shape parameter. The data was ﬁt with least
squares regression.
RESULTS
THE EXPECTED VALUE OF UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES INFLUENCES CHOICE
PREFERENCES
In experiment 1, we examined the allocation of choices made dur-
ing two-target trials across 49 prospects (Figure 1A; Table 1). The
two-target trials (25%) analyzed here were interspersed with a
majority of single-target trials (75%). We hypothesized that EV
will inﬂuence choice preferences in two-target trials. In a repre-
sentative equal EV block (Figure 2A), approximately the same
number of saccades were directed to each target. Conversely, in
a block with a higher valued left target, more leftward saccades
were chosen (Figure 2B). Across all 49 prospects, we found that
the EV of the targets was correlated to the allocation of choices
(Figure 2C; logistic ﬁts: Monkey B; R = 0.67 and Figure 2D;
Monkey H; R = 0.58, p < 0.05, respectively). Furthermore, ani-
mals tended to maximize, or choose one target exclusively, when
EV was highly skewed. When we analyzed each decision factor
independently, we found that probability of reward had no inﬂu-
ence on the allocation of choices (Figures 2E,F, p > 0.05), but
reward magnitude (Figure 2G; logistic ﬁts; Monkey B; R = 0.88
and Figure 2H; Monkey H; R = 0.94, p < 0.01, respectively) had
a strong inﬂuence on choice behavior. Furthermore, we found
that reward magnitude exerted a signiﬁcantly stronger effect
on choice allocation than relative EV (p < 0.02, Fisher r-to-z
transformation).
Although it is clear that, in this task, monkeys weighed reward
magnitudemore heavily than probability, additional analysis indi-
cated that probability did have an effect when reward magnitudes
were similar (Figure 3).We re-plotted the data from Figures 2C,D
to highlight how choices were allocatedwithin each speciﬁc proba-
bility and rewardmagnitude condition. Rewardmagnitude always
had a strong effect on choice behavior, regardless of its associated
outcome probability (Figures 3A,B). Probability, however, had an
effect only when reward magnitudes were approximately equal
(e.g., cyan lines, Figures 3C,D) and had negligible effect when
reward magnitudes became skewed.
THE EXPECTED VALUE OF UNCERTAIN MOVEMENTS INFLUENCES
SACCADE PREPARATION
We examined changes in SRT during single-target trials of exper-
iment 1. We hypothesized that changes in EV would lead to a bias
FIGURE 2 | Influence of decision factors on choice preference during
two-target trials. All data is taken from the two-target trials of Experiment
#1. (A,B) Individual eye traces for equal value (50% left probability/50% left
reward magnitude) and skewed value (50% left probability/62% left reward
magnitude) blocks of trials. Each line represents horizontal eye position on a
single trial. (C,D) Inﬂuence of relative expected value on saccadic choices.
Each dot represents 50–75 trials of a particular prospect collapsed over two
to three blocks of trials. Correlation coefﬁcients (R) are based on least
square ﬁts of a logistic function (black lines). The large gray dot indicates the
equal value prospect. (E,F) Inﬂuence of relative reward probability on
saccadic choices. (G,H) Inﬂuence of relative reward magnitude on saccadic
choices.
in saccade preparation, in turn leading to skewed SRTs. Figure 4A
shows a representative block with equal EVs for the two targets.
Saccades were initiated with similar latencies regardless of which
target was ultimately presented. Conversely, when EV was skewed
in favor of the rightward target, SRTs were shorter to the right and
longer to the left (Figure 4B). Across all 49 prospects, we found
that SRTs were signiﬁcantly correlated to relative EV (Figure 4C;
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FIGURE 3 | Contribution of reward and probability of choice. Each point
represents 50–75 trials of a speciﬁc prospect. Same data as Figures 2C,D.
(A,B) Contribution of reward magnitude. Each color indicates a group of
prospects with the same probability. Within each color, each point represents
a different reward magnitude condition. In order, red was the lowest
probability, followed by green, blue, cyan, yellow, magenta, and black was the
highest. SeeTable 1 for exact values. (C,D) Contribution of reward probability.
Each color indicates a group of prospects with the same reward magnitude
and each point within the colored groups represents a different reward
probability.
R =−0.67, p < 0.05; Figure 4D; R =−0.52, p < 0.05). When we
analyzed each decision factor independently we found that, sim-
ilar to choice allocation, there was no correlation found between
SRTand the probability of target appearance (Figures 4E,F).How-
ever, a signiﬁcant correlation between SRTs and rewardmagnitude
(Figure 4G;R =−0.80, p < 0.05; Figure 4H;R =−0.90, p < 0.05)
was found. We also found that reward magnitude was signiﬁ-
cantly more correlated to SRTs than relative EV in both monkeys
(p < 0.05, Fisher r-to-z transformation).
Whereas we found, using the model selection criterion derived
from Akaike’s Information Criterion (Akaike, 1973; Sakamoto
et al., 1986), that logistic functions provided signiﬁcantly better
ﬁts than linear regressions for the effects of value on choice data
(p < 0.05), the opposite was true for the effects of value on SRTs
(p < 0.05). This suggests that the inﬂuence of value on choice
quickly leads to maximization of binary responses whereas the
effects of value on SRTs are more continuous.
Saccadic reaction times were longer on average across the 49
prospects for two-target trials compared to single-target trials
(Figures 4C,D; 31ms for monkey B, 67ms for monkey H). This
slowing is consistent with competitive inhibition resulting from
the simultaneous presentation of two targets (Munoz and Istvan,
1998). Furthermore, the effects of value on SRT in two-target trials
were attenuated, as shown by the shallower slopes of the linear ﬁts
when compared to single-target trial data. These correlations were
also signiﬁcantlyworse than those foundbetween value and SRT in
single-target trials (p < 0.05, Fisher r-to-z transformation). Lastly,
these effects were less consistent in two-target trials compared
to single-target trials, with one monkey showing a slight positive
slope and the other showing a slight negative slope between value
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FIGURE 4 | Influence of decision factors on SRT during single-target
trials. (A,B) Individual eye traces for equal value (50% left probability/50%
left reward magnitude) and skewed value (10% left probability/38% left
reward) blocks of trials. (C,D) Relationship between relative expected value
of the left target and SRT for each monkey. Each black point represents
150–225 single-target trials of a speciﬁc prospect collapsed across two to
three blocks of trials. Each blue point represents 50–75 two-target trials
collapsed across two to three blocks of trials. (E,F) Relationship between
probability and SRT for each monkey. (G,H) Relationship between reward
magnitude and SRT for each monkey.
and SRT (Figure 4C; Monkey B; R =−0.47, Figure 4D; Monkey
H; R = 0.36).
We further examined the effects of probability and rewardmag-
nitude on SRT by replotting the data from Figures 4C,D with each
reward magnitude and probability condition highlighted. Simi-
lar to choice, we found that reward magnitude exhibits a strong
FIGURE 5 | Contribution of reward magnitude and probability to SRT.
Each point represents 150–225 trials of a speciﬁc prospect collapsed across
two to three blocks of trials. Same single-target data as Figures 4C,D. (A,B)
Contribution of reward magnitude. Each color indicates a group of
prospects with the same probability. Within each color, each point
represents a different reward magnitude condition. In order, red was the
lowest probability, followed by green, blue, cyan, yellow, magenta, and
black was the highest. SeeTable 1 for exact values. (C,D) Contribution of
reward probability. Each color indicates a group of prospects with the same
reward magnitude and each point within the colored groups represents a
different reward probability.
effect on SRT, regardless of probability (Figures 5A,B). Probability
exhibits little, if any, effect, except, perhaps, when reward magni-
tude was less biased between the two-target locations (Figure 5C;
cyan lines, R =−0.76, p < 0.05; Figure 5D; cyan lines, R =−0.63,
p > 0.05).
We have previously shown that mean SRTs were modulated by
changes in EV in humans (Milstein and Dorris, 2007). Here we
examined the relative contribution of increasing and decreasing
saccade latencies across prospects by examining SRT distributions
in more detail. Similar SRT distributions were observed during
an equal value block (Figure 6A) with the majority of saccades
centered around 200ms. These distributions changed when the
EV of the two targets was skewed (Figure 6B) with the length-
ening of SRTs for the low-valued targets becoming particularly
pronounced. The overall effect of value on SRTs was quite pow-
erful when one considers that monkeys were simply required to
look to a single-target that suddenly appeared in a darkened room.
The SRT differences spanned 348 ms for monkey B and 460ms in
monkey H across prospects. Across all prospects (Figures 6C,D),
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FIGURE 6 |The influence of value on SRT distributions. (A,B)
Histograms for equal value (50% left probability/50% left reward
magnitude) and skewed value (10% left probability/38% left reward
magnitude) blocks of trials. Black bars represent SRTs to the right target,
gray bars represent SRTs to the left target. The mean of each distribution is
indicated by the solid vertical lines. (C,D) Same single-target data set as
Figures 4C,D. Each data point represents one of the 49 different prospects,
composed of 150–225 individual trials collapsed over two to three blocks of
the same prospect. Blocks are not sorted on value, but on the difference in
SRTs between the left and right targets. Enlarged points are blocks in which
the value was equal to the left and right targets. The relative expected value
of each point is indicated by the heat map legend on the right.
the differences in SRT were more heavily inﬂuenced by length-
ening of SRTs to the low value target. Shortening of SRTs to the
high-valued target displayed a ﬂoor effect.
INFLUENCE OF VALUE ON OCULOMOTOR CAPTURES
In experiment 2,we probed the spatial allocation of saccade prepa-
ration more closely by occasionally presenting a distractor at one
of three locations (Figure 1C). Oculomotor captures were directed
toward left and right distractors in roughly equal proportion
when the targets were of equal value (Figure 7A) but became
biased in favor of locations associated with targets of higher
value (Figure 7B). Across prospects, there was a positive corre-
lation between the relative EV of the targets and the proportion
of oculomotor captures directed to distractors at those locations
(Figure 7C – R = 0.48, p < 0.05; Figure 7D – R = 0.77, p < 0.05).
Bothmonkeys rarely, if ever, looked towarddistractors presented at
the valueless upward location (Figures 7C,D, open circles). Lastly,
oculomotor captures were compared with an established measure
of saccade preparation, SRT (Figures 4C,D). Strong correlations
were found to exist between oculomotor captures and SRT differ-
ences across the same prospects (Figure 7E: Monkey B – R = 0.94;
p < 0.05; Figure 7F: Monkey H – R = 0.93, p < 0.05).
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SRTs AND CHOICES ACROSS PROSPECTS
We capitalized on the interleaved two-target (Figure 1A; 25% of
trials) and single-target trial (Figure 1B; 75%of trials) structure of
FIGURE 7 | Influence of expected value on oculomotor captures. (A,B)
Individual eye traces for equal value (50% left probability/50% left reward
magnitude) and skewed value (50% left probability/62% left reward
magnitude) blocks of trials. Red lines indicate target-directed saccades,
green indicate distractor-directed saccades. Thick lines indicate time of
distractor (green) and target (red) appearance, respectively. (C,D) Each
point is calculated from approximately 700 trials with data collapsed for left
and right oculomotor captures for the same prospects. Filled circles
represent oculomotor captures to distractors that appeared at potential
target locations. Unﬁlled circles represent oculomotor captures to vertical
distractors where no target was ever presented. (E,F) Relationship
between relative SRT and proportion of oculomotor captures on each block.
Same data as in (C,D).
experiment 1 to examine the relationship between SRTs and choice
preference across prospects. We hypothesized that revealed choice
preferences from two-target trials, an established index of relative
subjective value (Gonzalez andWu,1999; Trepel et al., 2005; Paulus
and Frank, 2006;Hsu et al., 2009; Glimcher, 2011),would correlate
with SRTs from single-target trials. The differences in single-target
SRTs lawfully reﬂected choice preferences during two-target trials
(Figures 8A,B). Both of these metrics are inﬂuenced by relative
EV, in that overall, there is a gradual transition from blue to
red points on this graph along both the abscissa and ordinate.
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FIGURE 8 |The relationship between saccadic choices and reaction times
when target value is manipulated. (A,B) Relative SRT from single-target
trials is plotted against the proportion of choice from two-target trials across
all 49 prospects. Each point represents ∼300 trials in Monkey B and ∼200
trials in Monkey H of a speciﬁc prospect whose relative expected value is
indicated by the heat map legend on the right.
More likely, however, the relationship between choice and SRT is
shaped by subjective value as evident by certain prospects whose
ordering does not follow a smooth transition from blue to red.
Putatively, the majority of this subjectivity arises because reward
magnitude is over weighted relative to probability in our task (see
Figures 2–5).
The relationship between SRT difference and choice was well
described by a logistic function (Figure 8A; R = 0.98 Monkey B
and Figure 8B; R = 0.99 Monkey H, p < 0.05, respectively). This
logistic function reﬂects how subjective value inﬂuences the selec-
tion and preparation of saccades. Importantly, the correlation
between SRT and choice allocation across prospects is signiﬁcantly
stronger than the correlation observed with choice or SRT with
any other decision factor (i.e., probability, reward magnitude, rel-
ative EV). This suggests that both choices and SRTs are inﬂuenced
by subjective value more than any objective decision factor alone
(p < 0.01, Fisher r-to-z transformation).
SACCADE PREPARATION IS INFLUENCED BY THE RELATIVE, NOT
ABSOLUTE, VALUE OF TARGETS
Up to this point, it is unclear whether the modulations in SRT are
caused by changes in the absolute value of rewardmagnitude avail-
able on each trial, or by changes in the value of one target relative to
the other. This confound arises because blocks with highly skewed
relative values also tend to be blocks in which monkeys receives
higher overall rates of reward (seeEq. 1).Herewe consider absolute
value to be similar to previous deﬁnitions of motivation (Stellar
and Stellar, 1985) deﬁned as the average reward harvested per trial
during a given prospect. To distinguish between these two possibil-
ities wemultiplied the rewardmagnitudes at both target locations,
which had the effect of increasing the absolute EV of each target
while leaving the relative EV of each target unchanged. SRTs were
inﬂuenced by changes in relative EV across blocks (p < 0.001, 1
way RM ANOVA) but not absolute changes in reward magnitude
values (Figures 9; p > 0.05 for bothmonkeys, 1 way RMANOVA).
DISCUSSION
Our ﬁndings suggest that the selection and preparation of saccadic
eye movements are strongly inﬂuenced by the relative expected
subjective value (RESV; Glimcher, 2011) of targets under condi-
tions of uncertainty. To establish the EV component of RESV, we
allowed monkeys to freely choose between prospects, in addition
to recording two other behavioral measures; SRT and oculomo-
tor captures. When monkeys were allowed to choose between
prospects, they tended to choose the prospect of higher EV
(Figure 2). Furthermore, the time to initiate saccades (Figure 4),
as well as the spatial allocation of oculomotor captures (Figure 7),
were inﬂuenced by EV. To establish the subjectivity (S) component
of RESV we examined interleaved single-target and two-target tri-
als. SRTs from single-target trials were correlated with the revealed
preferences from the two-target trials (Figure 8), suggesting a
relationship between subjective preferences and the allocation of
saccade preparation under conditions of uncertainty. In additional
support of this subjectivity, reward magnitude was more heavily
weighted than probability when monkeys were choosing where to
look (Figures 2 and 3) and when preparing saccades (Figures 4
and 5). To establish the relativity (R) component of RESV, reward
magnitudes for all targets were increased by multiples. SRTs were
inﬂuenced by changing relative value of the two targets between
prospects but not changes in absolute value that accompanied
multiples of reward magnitude (Figure 9).
RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF REWARD MAGNITUDE AND PROBABILITY
Previous research has shown that saccade generation is inﬂuenced
by probability and reward magnitude (Basso and Wurtz, 1998;
Dorris andMunoz, 1998; Leon and Shadlen, 1999; Platt and Glim-
cher, 1999; Lauwereyns et al., 2002; Takikawa et al., 2002; Ikeda
and Hikosaka, 2003; Ding and Hikosaka, 2007; Milstein and Dor-
ris, 2007). In those studies, one decision factor was held constant
while the otherwasmanipulated.However, the current results, and
our previous work in humans (Milstein and Dorris, 2007), suggest
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FIGURE 9 | Comparative effects of relative and absolute expected value
on SRT. Each data point represents 200–300 individual trials of a separate task
comprised of 100% single-target trials. Three conditions were performed that
had the same relative expected values (indicated by the bold cells inTable 1),
however, all reward magnitudes were increased by the stated multiples
between conditions (i.e., different absolute expected value at each location).
that some weighted combination of these two factors inﬂuences
saccade generation rather than either factor alone.
Reward magnitude exerted a stronger effect than reward prob-
ability in inﬂuencing choice in both monkeys (Figures 2 and 3)
to the extent that probability only had a modest inﬂuence when
rewards were nearly equal. Our ﬁndings are consistent with previ-
ous research in monkeys showing an effect of reward probability
under equal rewardmagnitude conditions (Basso andWurtz,1998;
Dorris and Munoz, 1998). Our ﬁndings provide an important
extension to this previous work by demonstrating that reward
magnitude dominates reward probability across a wide range of
saccade target values.
This seemingly “risk seeking” behavior has been demonstrated
in monkeys in other contexts (Baum, 1979; Anderson et al., 2002;
Davison and Baum, 2003; Lau and Glimcher, 2005; McCoy and
Platt, 2005; So and Stuphorn, 2010). Evidence from other animal
models has shown that animals may behave differently based on
their physiological state (Caraco, 1981). In the case of these ani-
mals, their powerful thirst may drive them to seek the risky option
in the chance that it will satiate them more rapidly, rather than
the more probable, but smaller reward. An additional factor is the
time in between each trial. Monkeys only had to wait 1 s for the
next trial to begin, and thus,may bemore willing to gamble for the
larger reward, knowing that they will get to have another chance
right after. Previous work has shown that if monkeys are forced
to wait for longer periods of time in between trials, they tend to
choose the less risky option (Hayden and Platt, 2007). The imme-
diacy of reward is clearly an important factor in the valuation of
choice for monkeys (Mazur, 1987; Frederick et al., 2002; Green
and Myerson, 2004; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008; Hwang et al.,
2009; Cai et al., 2011), and the task in this study may not ade-
quately tease apart risk from the temporal discounting of rewards.
Another potential reason for a larger reward magnitude contribu-
tion is that thirsty monkeys were given reward immediately upon
successful completion of a trial rather than abstract feedback to be
delivered later in the experiment as is typical of human economic
experiments. Potentially contributing to this, probability had to
be updated slowly through experience over many trials whereas
reward magnitude was sensed immediately on the tongue. How-
ever, we did not notice any appreciable changes in the inﬂuence
of probability on choices throughout as trial blocks progressed (t -
test comparing choice allocation at beginning and end of blocks,
p > 0.10).
ESTABLISHING THE EXPECTED VALUE (EV) COMPONENT OF RESV
Throughout these experiments, EV was correlated to several
behavioral measures. First, EV inﬂuenced the allocation of choices
between targets (Figures 2C,D). This is an important ﬁrst step
because revealed preference is a classic behavioral measure of sub-
jective value (Samuelson,1938).However, simply relying on choice
allocation has limitations. Choice is a discrete measure and thus
better suited for assessing which option is more valuable or pre-
ferred rather than the degree to which an option is more valuable
than another as reﬂected in the maximizing of choices at highly
skewed values (Figures 2C,D). EV also inﬂuenced the continu-
ous measure of SRTs during single-target trials (Figures 4C,D).
The difference in SRTs across prospects was 348ms in monkey
B and 460ms in monkey H, effects that greatly exceed other
well-studied SRT phenomena (e.g., repetition effects= 7ms, Dor-
ris et al., 2000; attention= 30ms, Fecteau et al., 2004; motiva-
tion= 3ms,Roesch andOlson,2004; inhibition of return= 20ms,
Dorris et al., 2002; Pro- versus anti-saccades= 41ms, Everling and
Munoz, 2000).
The inﬂuence of EV on saccade preparation resulted in an
asymmetric distribution of SRTs (Figure 5). These were char-
acterized by relatively narrow SRTs distributions toward high-
valued targets and broad SRT distributions toward low-valued
targets. Overall, the majority of the SRT differences were the
result of lengthening to low-valued targets rather than shorten-
ing toward high-valued targets. Presumably the ﬂoor effect for
www.frontiersin.org October 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 122 | 9
Milstein and Dorris Subjective value inﬂuences saccade generation
speeding of SRTs is dictated by physiological limits of conduction
within visuosaccadic circuits (i.e., express saccades – Munoz et al.,
2000).
Although EV exerted an inﬂuence on single-target trials,
this effect was both slowed and attenuated in two-target trials
(Figures 4C,D, blue points). This is likely caused by competitive
inhibitionbetween the two targets,which appear in opposite hemi-
ﬁelds of visual space (Koch and Ullman, 1985; Munoz and Istvan,
1998). Furthermore, the SRTs in two-target trials were uncorre-
lated to the difﬁculty of the selection process (i.e., how close the
two prospects on a given trial were in value), which would be
characterized by an inverted “U” shaped function centered on
equally valued targets (p > 0.05). These results show that SRT
may not be an accurate behavioral measure of value in tasks that
are not speeded or allow the subjects to choose between multiple
prospects.
The proportion of oculomotor captures correlated with the EV
of targets at particular locations (Figure 7). Importantly, very few
oculomotor captures were directed to the valueless distractors pre-
sented at a location orthogonal to the valued targets. These results
mirror human work demonstrating that saccade preparation is
spatially allocated based on the relative value of potential targets
(Milstein and Dorris, 2007).
In summary, we established the EV of RESV in three steps.
First, discreet choice preferences correlated with the relative EV
of the two targets. Second, continuous SRTs were correlated with
the EV of single targets. Third, the pattern of oculomotor captures
demonstrated that saccade preparation is spatially allocated based
on the EV of saccadic targets.
ESTABLISHING THE SUBJECTIVE (S) COMPONENT OF RESV
We examined the subjective component of the value process out-
lined by behavioral economics (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Trepel
et al., 2005; Paulus and Frank, 2006; Hsu et al., 2009) by relating
SRTs to free choices during interleaved single and two-target tri-
als. There was a lawful relationship between SRTs and preferences
(Figure 8). More speciﬁcally, the logistic function that describes
this relationship is important because it suggests that the process
that transforms value into action follows a “soft-max” decision
rule. The soft-max rule transforms the difference in value distrib-
utions between available options into a probability of choosing an
action (Daw et al., 2006). This contrasts with a step-function, that
characterizes an ε-greedy decision rule, in which the higher valued
target is always selected or, in our case, to which all saccade prepa-
ration is allocated. Moreover, our data suggest that SRTs capture
the subjectivity associatedwith estimating valuebecause theymore
strongly reﬂect choice preferences (Figure 8) compared to EV, as
well as account for blocks in which themonkeys chose the target of
lower EV (Figures 2C,D). Interestingly, this soft-max decision rule
has been seen in other studies that use choice instead of SRT as a
measure of value (McCoy and Platt, 2005; So and Stuphorn, 2010).
Our choice results were in between a soft-max and ε-greedy func-
tion relative to these previous studies. Perhaps this reﬂects a differ-
ence in using abstract symbols to represent prospects on each trial,
whereas our prospects were learned by experience over a block of
trials.
In other contexts, subjective value has been measured from
mapsof indifference curves constructed across a range of prospects
(Gonzalez andWu,1999;Kording et al., 2004; Padoa-Schioppa and
Assad, 2006; Paulus and Frank, 2006). An added beneﬁt of SRTs
is that, in addition to providing an aggregate measure of value for
a given prospect, their variability may provide insight into how
subjective value is dynamically updated with trial by trial expe-
rience (Thevarajah et al., 2010). Indeed our preliminary analyses
suggest trial by trial SRTs in single-target trials closely track trial by
trial estimates of action value derived from reinforcement learning
models (Milstein et al., 2010).
ESTABLISHING THE RELATIVE (R) COMPONENT OF RESV
Both relative and absolute value play a role in decision making
theories. Economic models of choice, such as prospect theory
(Kahneman andTversky, 1979; Tversky andKahneman, 1992; Tre-
pel et al., 2005) posit that the value, or utility, of an action can only
be determined relative to other available options. Absolute value,
however, is thought to inﬂuence choice by increasing motivation;
the more reward available on a given trial, the more motivated
the subject is to respond (Stellar and Stellar, 1985; Roesch and
Olson, 2003, 2004; Ravel and Richmond, 2006). In this context,
experiment 3 examined how saccade preparation was inﬂuenced
by the relative and absolute value of available options. We found
that motivation, deﬁned as the average reward harvested per trial
during a given prospect (Roesch and Olson, 2004; Milstein and
Dorris, 2007) had no effect on SRTs whereas RESV had a large
effect across prospects (Figure 9). Although the effects of motiva-
tion have been observed in other tasks (Roesch and Olson, 2003,
2004; Ravel and Richmond, 2006), it appears to play a small role in
tasks such as this, where saccade preparation can be biased across
visual space based on the learned value of target locations. Perhaps
motivation is more inﬂuential to whether the subject decides to
complete the task or not. For example, as the animal becomes sati-
ated, he lacks the motivation to participate in the task; however
if he does participate, his saccade preparatory processes should
follow RESV.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that RESV is not only an important factor for delib-
erative decision making in primates, but also for the selection
and advanced preparation of simple motor actions, such as sac-
cadic eye movements. RESV is subjective in the sense that it is
computed by each subject’s internal weightings of probability and
reward magnitude and relative in that behavior was inﬂuenced by
the difference in value of available actions rather than the absolute
value of any action alone.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was supported by the Canadian Institutes of Health
Research.D.M.Milstein is supported by aQueen’sUniversity grad-
uate fellowship and anOntarioGraduate Scholarship.M.C.Dorris
is supported by the Canadian Research Chairs program.We thank
S. Hickman, M. Lewis for technical assistance and E. Ryklin for
the customization of the data acquisition program. We thank J.
Green for animal care, training, and help with the collection of
behavioral data.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience October 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 122 | 10
Milstein and Dorris Subjective value inﬂuences saccade generation
REFERENCES
Akaike, H. (1973). “Information the-
ory and an extension of the max-
imum likelihood principle,” Second
International Symposiumof Informa-
tion Theory, eds B. N. Petrof and F.
Csazi (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado),
199–214.
Anderson, K. G., Velkey, A. J., and
Woolverton, W. L. (2002). The gen-
eralized matching law as a predictor
of choice between cocaine and food
in rhesus monkeys. Psychopharma-
cology (Berl.) 163, 319–326.
Basso, M. A., and Wurtz, R. H. (1998).
Modulation of neuronal activity in
superior colliculus by changes in
target probability. J. Neurosci. 18,
7519–7534.
Baum,W. M. (1979). Matching, under-
matching, and overmatching in
studies of choice. J. Exp. Anal. Behav.
32, 269–281.
Cai, X., Kim, S., and Lee, D. (2011).
Heterogeneous coding of temporally
discounted values in the dorsal and
ventral striatum during intertempo-
ral choice. Neuron 69, 170–182.
Caraco, T. (1981). Energy budgets, risk
and foraging preferences in dark-
eyed juncos (Junco hyemalis). Behav.
Ecol. Sociobiol. (Print) 8, 213–217.
Davison, M., and Baum, W. M. (2003).
Every reinforcer counts: reinforcer
magnitude and local preference. J.
Exp. Anal. Behav. 80, 95–129.
Daw, N. D., O’Doherty, J. P., Dayan, P.,
Seymour, B., and Dolan, R. J. (2006).
Cortical substrates for exploratory
decisions in humans. Nature 441,
876–879.
Dayan, P., and Abbott, L. (2001). The-
oretical Neuroscience. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Ding, L., and Hikosaka,O. (2007). Tem-
poral development of asymmetric
reward-induced bias in macaques. J.
Neurophysiol. 97, 57–61.
Dorris, M. C., Klein, R. M., Everling, S.,
and Munoz, D. P. (2002). Contribu-
tion of the primate superior collicu-
lus to inhibition of return. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 14, 1256–1263.
Dorris, M. C., and Munoz, D. P.
(1998). Saccadic probability inﬂu-
ences motor preparation signals and
time to saccadic initiation. J. Neu-
rosci. 18, 7015–7026.
Dorris,M.C.,Pare,M., andMunoz,D. P.
(1997). Neuronal activity inmonkey
superior colliculus related to the ini-
tiation of saccadic eyemovements. J.
Neurosci. 17, 8566–8579.
Dorris, M. C., Pare, M., and Munoz,
D. P. (2000). Immediate neural plas-
ticity shapes motor performance. J.
Neurosci. 20, RC52.
Everling, S., and Munoz, D. P. (2000).
Neuronal correlates for preparatory
set associated with pro-saccades and
anti-saccades in the primate frontal
eye ﬁeld. J. Neurosci. 20, 387–400.
Fecteau, J. H., Bell, A. H., and Munoz,
D. P. (2004). Neural correlates of the
automatic and goal-driven biases in
orienting spatial attention. J. Neuro-
physiol. 92, 1728–1737.
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., and
O’Donoghue, T. (2002). Time dis-
counting and time preference: a crit-
ical review. J. Econ. Lit. 351–401.
Glimcher, P. W. (2003). The neuro-
biology of visual-saccadic decision
making. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 26,
133–179.
Glimcher, P. W. (2011). Foundations of
Neuroeconomic Analysis. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Gonzalez, R., and Wu, G. (1999). On
the shape of the probability weight-
ing function. Cogn. Psychol. 38,
129–166.
Green, L., andMyerson, J. (2004). A dis-
counting framework for choice with
delayed and probabilistic rewards.
Psychol. Bull. 130, 769–792.
Hayden, B. Y., and Platt, M. L. (2007).
Temporal discounting predicts risk
sensitivity in rhesus macaques. Curr.
Biol. 17, 49–53.
Hsu, M., Krajbich, I., Zhao, C., and
Camerer, C. F. (2009). Neural
response to reward anticipation
under risk is nonlinear in probabili-
ties. J. Neurosci. 29, 2231–2237.
Hwang, J., Kim, S., and Lee, D. (2009).
Temporal discounting and inter-
temporal choice in rhesus mon-
keys. Front. Behav. Neurosci. 3:9.
doi:10.3389/neuro.08.009.2009
Ikeda, T., and Hikosaka, O. (2003).
Reward-dependent gain and bias of
visual responses in primate superior
colliculus. Neuron 39, 693–700.
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979).
Prospect theory: an analysis of deci-
sion under risk. Econometrica 47,
263–291.
Kalenscher, T., and Pennartz, C. M.
(2008). Is a bird in the hand
worth two in the future? The
neuroeconomics of intertemporal
decision-making. Prog. Neurobiol.
84, 284–315.
Koch, C., and Ullman, S. (1985).
Shifts in selective visual attention:
towards the underlying neural cir-
cuitry. Hum. Neurobiol. 4, 219–227.
Kording, K. P., Fukunaga, I., Howard,
I. S., Ingram, J. N., and Wolpert,
D. M. (2004). A neuroeconom-
ics approach to inferring utility
functions in sensorimotor control.
PLoS Biol. 2, e330. doi:10.1371/jour-
nal.pbio.0020330
Lau, B., and Glimcher, P. W. (2005).
Dynamic response-by-response
models of matching behavior in
rhesus monkeys. J. Exp. Anal. Behav.
84, 555–579.
Lauwereyns, J., Watanabe, K., Coe, B.,
and Hikosaka, O. (2002). A neural
correlate of response bias in mon-
key caudate nucleus. Nature 418,
413–417.
Leon, M. I., and Shadlen, M. N. (1999).
Effect of expected reward magni-
tude on the response of neurons
in the dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex of the macaque. Neuron 24,
415–425.
Mazur, J. (1987). “Quantitative analy-
ses of behavior,” The Effect of Delay
and of Intervening Events on Rein-
forcementValue,Vol. 5 (Hillsdale,NJ:
Erlbaum), 55–73.
McCoy, A. N., and Platt, M. L. (2005).
Risk-sensitive neurons in macaque
posterior cingulate cortex.Nat. Neu-
rosci. 8, 1220–1227.
Milstein, D., Webb, R., and Dorris,
M. (2010). Reinforcement learning
algorithms predict changes in activ-
ity within the superior colliculus in
response to changes in saccade value.
Soc. Neurosci.
Milstein, D. M., and Dorris, M. C.
(2007). The inﬂuence of expected
value on saccadic preparation. J.
Neurosci. 27, 4810–4818.
Munoz, D. P., Dorris, M. C., Pare,
M., and Everling, S. (2000). On
your mark, get set: brainstem cir-
cuitry underlying saccadic initia-
tion. Can. J. Physiol. Pharmacol. 78,
934–944.
Munoz, D. P., and Istvan, P. J. (1998).
Lateral inhibitory interactions in the
intermediate layers of the monkey
superior colliculus. J. Neurophysiol.
79, 1193–1209.
Padoa-Schioppa, C., and Assad, J. A.
(2006). Neurons in the orbitofrontal
cortex encode economic value.
Nature 441, 223–226.
Paulus, M. P., and Frank, L. R. (2006).
Anterior cingulate activity modu-
lates nonlinear decisionweight func-
tion of uncertain prospects. Neu-
roimage 30, 668–677.
Platt, M. L., and Glimcher, P.W. (1999).
Neural correlates of decision vari-
ables in parietal cortex. Nature 400,
233–238.
Ravel, S., and Richmond, B. J. (2006).
Dopamine neuronal responses in
monkeys performing visually cued
reward schedules. Eur. J. Neurosci.
24, 277–290.
Roesch, M. R., and Olson, C. R. (2003).
Impact of expected reward on neu-
ronal activity in prefrontal cortex,
frontal and supplementary eye ﬁelds
and premotor cortex. J. Neurophys-
iol. 90, 1766–1789.
Roesch, M. R., and Olson, C. R.
(2004). Neuronal activity related to
reward value and motivation in pri-
mate frontal cortex. Science 304,
307–310.
Rolls, E. (2005). Emotion Explained.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rolls, E. T., McCabe, C., and Redoute,
J. (2008). Expected value, reward
outcome, and temporal difference
error representations in a probabilis-
tic decision task. Cereb. Cortex 18,
652–663.
Rorie, A. E., Gao, J., McClelland, J. L.,
and Newsome, W. T. (2010). Inte-
gration of sensory and reward infor-
mation during perceptual decision-
making in lateral intraparietal cortex
(LIP) of the macaque monkey. PLoS
ONE 5, e9308. doi:10.1371/jour-
nal.pone.0009308
Sakamoto, Y., Ishigura, M., and Kita-
gawa, G. (1986). Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion Statistics. Dordrecht:
Reidel.
Samuelson, P. (1938). A note on the
pure theory of consumers’ behav-
iour. Economica 5, 61–71.
Saslow, M. G. (1967). Latency for sac-
cadic eyemovement. J. Opt. Soc. Am.
57, 1030–1033.
So, N. Y., and Stuphorn, V. (2010). Sup-
plementary eye ﬁeld encodes option
and action value for saccades with
variable reward. J. Neurophysiol. 104,
2634–2653.
Stellar, J., andStellar,E. (1985).TheNeu-
robiology of Motivation and Reward.
New York: Springer-Verlag.
Takikawa, Y., Kawagoe, R., Itoh, H.,
Nakahara, H., and Hikosaka, O.
(2002). Modulation of saccadic eye
movements by predicted reward
outcome. Exp. Brain Res. 142,
284–291.
Theeuwes, J., Kramer, A., Hahn, S.,
and Irwin, D. (1998). Our eyes
do not always go where we want
them to go: capture of the eyes
by new objects. Psychol. Sci. 9,
379–385.
Thevarajah, D., Webb, R., Ferrall,
C., and Dorris, M. C. (2010).
Modeling the value of strategic
actions in the superior collicu-
lus. Front. Behav. Neurosci. 3:57.
doi:10.3389/neuro.08.057.2009
Trepel, C., Fox, C. R., and Poldrack,
R. A. (2005). Prospect theory on
the brain? Toward a cognitive neu-
roscience of decision under risk.
Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 23,
34–50.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1992).
Advances in prospect theory:
cumulative representation of
uncertainty. J. Risk Uncertain. 5,
297–323.
Yang, T., and Shadlen, M. N. (2007).
Probabilistic reasoning by neurons.
Nature 447, 1075–1080.
www.frontiersin.org October 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 122 | 11
Milstein and Dorris Subjective value inﬂuences saccade generation
Conﬂict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence
of any commercial or ﬁnancial
relationships that could be con-
strued as a potential conﬂict of
interest.
Received: 14 June 2011; accepted: 22 Sep-
tember 2011; published online: 17 Octo-
ber 2011.
Citation: Milstein DM and Dor-
ris MC (2011) The relationship
between saccadic choice and reaction
times with manipulations of target
value. Front. Neurosci. 5:122. doi:
10.3389/fnins.2011.00122
This article was submitted to Frontiers
in Decision Neuroscience, a specialty of
Frontiers in Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2011 Milstein and Dorris.
This is an open-access article subject to a
non-exclusive license between the authors
and Frontiers Media SA, which per-
mits use, distribution and reproduction
in other forums, provided the original
authors and source are credited and
other Frontiers conditions are complied
with.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience October 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 122 | 12
